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State v. Norman: Self-Defense Unavailable to Battered Women
Who Kill Passive Abusers
The law of North Carolina traditionally has recognized the right to defend
oneself when presented with a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm.1
Recently, the North Carolina Supreme Court faced the difficult task of applying
the traditional rules of self-defense 2 to a nontraditional defendant, the battered
woman. 3 Defendant in State v. Norman,4 a battered wife, killed her husband as
he slept. At trial she asserted that the killing was an act of self-defense. The
court held that a sleeping victim, as a matter of law,5 does not present the immi-
nent threat 6 required before a defendant is entitled to an instruction on either
1. See State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 70-74, 357 S.E.2d 654, 659-60 (1987); State v. Norris,
303 N.C. 526, 530, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572-73 (1981); State v. Holland, 193 N.C. 713, 718-20, 138 S.E.
8, 10-11 (1927). "Self-defense" is the term of art that describes this right. BLACK'S LAW DicTION-
ARY 1219-20 (5th ed. 1979).
2. Self-defense may be either "perfect" or "imperfect." These definitions differ in essential
elements and in classification as either justification or excuse.
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on perfect self-defense if the evidence tends to show
that at the time of the killing: 1) the defendant believed it necessary to kill the victim to save himself
from imminent death or great bodily harm; 2) the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant
were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness; 3) the defendant
was not the aggressor in the confrontation; and 4) the defendant did not use more force thah actually
or apparently was necessary under the circumstances. Gappins, 320 N.C. at 70-71, 357 S.E.2d at
659. An instruction on imperfect self-defense is appropriate when the evidence tends to support the
existence of only the first two elements. State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 159, 297 S.E.2d 563, 568
(1982).
Perfect self-defense is a justification for homicide. State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 259-60, 378
S.E.2d 8, 13 (1989). If a homicide is "justified," the defendant is exonerated and is entitled to an
acquittal. Norris, 303 N.C. at 530, 279 S.E.2d at 573; see also Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet:
The Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REv. 545, 563
(1988). At common law, the law "excused" crimes if the unique characteristics of the defendant
rendered him less blameworthy. Id. Imperfect self-defense, a common-law "excuse," may afford a
defendant a mitigated sentence, but does not guarantee acquittal. State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 52, 340
S.E.2d 439, 441 (1986). Other examples of excusable homicide are accidental killings and killings
committed by insane persons. R. PERKINS & R. BoYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 1124 (3d ed. 1982). The
crucial distinction is that an excused defendant, if convicted, is still guilty of a lesser crime, such as
manslaughter rather than murder, W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 463 (2d ed. 1986),
while one whose actions are justified is not guilty of any crime, id. at 454-63; R. PERKINS & R.
BoYcE, supra, at 1113-16; see also Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Acci-
dent on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 11 (1986) (arguing for classification
of self-defense as an excuse for battered women).
3. Battered woman syndrome describes a physically and psychologically abusive relationship
between a woman and her spouse or lover and its effects on the battered woman. L. VALKER, THE
BATrERED WOMAN xv (1979). This condition has also been described as "battered wife syndrome,"
see State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775, 424 A.2d 171, 173 (1980), and "battered spouse" syndrome,
see State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 488, 329 N.W.2d 161, 163 (1983). It is not a mental illness and
does not appear in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III); however,
battered woman syndrome is similar to forms of post-traumatic stress disorder, such as that exper-
ienced after combat or natural disasters, which are listed in DSM-III. People v. Axis, 215 Cal. App.
3d 1178, 1194, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 177 (1989) (recounting testimony of Dr. Lenore Walker). For a
full discussion of battered woman syndrome, see infra text accompanying notes 39-63.
4. 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
5. Black's Law Dictionary defines "matter of law" as "[w]hatever is to be ascertained or de-
cided by the application of statutory rules or the principles and determinations of the law, as distin-
guished from the investigation of particular facts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 883 (5th ed. 1979).
6. An imminent threat must exist in order for defendant's belief in the need for self-defense to
be reasonable. See State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 73, 357 S.E.2d 654, 660 (1987); State v. Mize, 316
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perfect or imperfect self-defense.7 The Norman defendant's unsuccessful at-
tempt to assert self-defense graphically illustrates the inability of the traditional
rules of self-defense to acknowledge and incorporate the unique psychology of
the battered woman.
This Note first examines the law of self-defense in North Carolina8 and
provides an overview of battered woman syndrome and the typical psychological
profile of a battered woman.9 It then analyzes both the North Carolina Court of
Appeals' and the North Carolina Supreme Court's applications of the law of
self-defense in Norman, in light of the evidence of Mrs. Norman's status as a
battered woman. 10 The author agrees with the Norman court's conclusion that
the traditional rules of self-defense are not applicable to battered women who
kill in nonconfrontational settings. The Note then discusses possible modifica-
tions in the law of self-defense and alternative defenses that would take into
consideration the special psychological condition of battered women. Neverthe-
less, the Note concludes that changing the current rules of self-defense to accom-
modate the battered woman's peculiar situation is not an acceptable solution.
Rather, the legislature should expand the defintion of voluntary manslaughter to
include cases in which the defendant establishes that she suffers from battered
woman syndrome. Further, the North Carolina General Assembly must enact
more comprehensive legislation addressing the plight of the battered woman in
an effort to prevent domestic violence from reaching the point at which violent
self-help is the only apparent remedy. 1
Judy and J.T. Norman's twenty-five-year marriage ended on June 12, 1985,
when Mrs. Norman shot and killed her husband as he slept.12 J.T. Norman's
death marked the culmination of a relationship that for more than twenty years
was characterized by his extreme physical and mental abuse of Mrs. Norman.13
N.C. 48, 53, 340 S.E.2d 439, 442 (1986); State v. Spaulding, 298 N.C. 149, 157, 257 S.E.2d 391, 396
(1979); State v. Kinney, 92 N.C. App. 671, 676, 375 S.E.2d 692, 695 (1989); infra text accompanying
notes 25-37 (discussing imminence and the other elements of self-defense).
7. Norman, 324 N.C. at 254, 378 S.E.2d at 9. For definitions of perfect and imperfect self-
defense, see supra note 2.
8. See infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 39-63 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 64-102 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
12. Norman, 324 N.C. at 254-55, 378 S.E.2d at 9-10. An autopsy report indicated that Mr.
Norman suffered three gunshot wounds to the head. Id. at 254, 378 S.E.2d at 9. At the time of his
death Mr. Norman had a blood-alcohol level of .12%, id., which rendered Mr. Norman legally
intoxicated under the standards of North Carolina law for operation of motor vehicles. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-138.1(a)(2) (1983) (establishing .10 as blood alcohol level at which one suffers legal
intoxication).
13. Norman, 324 N.C. at 255-58, 378 S.E.2d at 9-11. Mrs. Norman testified that her husband's
alcoholism and abusive behavior surfaced approximately five years into their marriage. Mr. Norman
regularly assaulted her, punching, kicking, slapping, and striking her with objects such as beer bot-
ties and glasses. She also described having cigarettes extinguished against her skin, hot coffee poured
on her, and glass and food crushed against her face. Id. at 255, 378 S.E.2d at 10.
In addition to the physical abuse, Mr. Norman forced Judy Norman to prostitute herself at
truck stops to support the family. Failure to earn a minimum sum per day resulted in severe beat-
ings. Id. He also forced Mrs. Norman to eat pet food out of pets' bowls and to bark like a dog. Id.
At other times he deprived her of food and forced her to sleep on the floor. Threats to kill or maim
her were routine. Id.
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After her arrest, Mrs. Norman faced charges of first degree murder. 14 At trial
Mrs. Norman testified that the intensity of the violence had escalated over the
thirty-six-hour period preceding the killing, prompting her to seek various
sources of help and even to attempt suicide. 15 The investigating officer re-
counted Mrs. Norman's statements to him that on the day of the killing she had
suffered repeated beatings at the hands of Mr. Norman. 16 According to the
officer, Mrs. Norman told him that when her husband fell asleep she took her
grandchild to her mother's house, obtained a gun, returned home, and killed
Mr. Norman in his sleep. 17
In order to demonstrate the reasonableness of Mrs. Norman's beliefs and
actions,1 8 the defense offered two experts who testified that Mrs. Norman fit the
proffile of a woman suffering from battered woman syndrome.1 9 The trial court
refused to submit the issue of self-defense to the jury, however, ruling that the
victim's passivity at the time of the killing barred Mrs. Norman from asserting
self-defense as a justification or as an excuse. 20 The jury convicted Mrs. Nor-
man of voluntary manslaughter,21 and the judge sentenced her to six years in
prison.22 The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the evidence was suffi-
14. Id. at 253, 378 S.E.2d at 9.
15. Id. at 256, 378 S.E.2d at 10. The day before the killing, police arrested Mr. Norman for
drunken driving. After his release the next morning, his physical abuse of Mrs. Norman became
more severe and his mood angrier. Mrs. Norman called the sheriff, but, fearing that her husband
would kill her if he were arrested and later released, refused to file a complaint. Id. Deputies left the
scene only to return one hour later after Mrs. Norman consumed a bottle of pills. Id.
The next day Mrs. Norman contacted a mental health center and explored the possibility of
involuntarily committing her husband. She also went to a social services office, but her husband
followed her, forced her to return home, and beat her severely. Id. at 257, 378 S.E.2d at 11. Later,
while Mrs. Norman drove Mr. Norman and a friend to Spartanburg, South Carolina, her husband
slapped her, kicked her in the head, doused her with beer, and told her that he would "cut her breast
off and shove it up her rear end." State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384, 387, 366 S.E.2d 586, 588
(1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
16. Norman, 324 N.C. at 254, 378 S.E.2d at 9.
17. Id. at 254-55, 378 S.E.2d at 9.
18. Id. at 258-59, 378 S.E.2d at 11-12.
19. Id. at 258, 378 S.E.2d at 11. For discussions of battered woman syndrome, see supra note 3
and infra notes 39-63 and accompanying text. The defense presented testimony by Dr. William
Tyson, a psychologist, and Dr. Robert Rollins, the attending physician who evaluated Mrs. Norman
at Dorothea Dix Hospital. Norman, 324 N.C. at 258, 378 S.E.2d at 11. Dr. Tyson stated his opinion
that "Mrs. Norman believed herself to be doomed ... that death was inevitable" and "that she had
no choice but to ... exhibit deadly force against Mr. Norman." Id. Dr. Rollins testified that Mrs.
Norman "saw herself as powerless to deal with the situation, that there was no alternative, no way
she could escape it" and that killing Mr. Norman appeared "necessary to Mrs. Norman." Id.
20. State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384, 391, 366 S.E.2d 586, 590 (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 253,
378 S.E.2d 8 (1989). For discussion of the distinction between justifications and excuses, see supra
note 2 and infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
21. The trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder, second degree murder, and volun-
tary manslaughter. Norman, 89 N.C. App. at 385, 366 S.E.2d at 587. First degree murder is an
"unlawful killing committed with malice and with premeditation and deliberation." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-17 (1986); State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 529, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1981). Second degree
murder is "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice and without premeditation and delib-
eration." State v. Jones, 299 N.C. 103, 109, 261 S.E.2d 1, 6 (1980). Voluntary manslaughter is "an
intentional killing without premeditation, deliberation or malice but done in the heat of passion
suddenly aroused by adequate provocation or in the exercise of imperfect self-defense where exces-
sive force under the circumstances was used or where defendant is the aggressor." State v. Wallace,
309 N.C. 141, 149, 305 S.E.2d 548, 553 (1983).
22. Norman, 89 N.C. App. at 384, 366 S.E.2d at 586-87.
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cient to entitle Mrs. Norman to an instruction on perfect self-defense, reversed
the trial court, and ordered a new trial.23 The North Carolina Supreme Court
ultimately reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's refusal to
give an instruction on self-defense. 24
North Carolina courts traditionally have recognized a right to an instruc-
tion on perfect self-defense in cases in which the evidence is sufficient to permit a
jury to find the existence of the following four elements:
1) the defendant believed it to be necessary to kill the victim to
save himself from imminent death or great bodily harm;
2) the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant were suffi-
cient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary
firmness;
3) the defendant was not the aggressor in the confrontation; and
4) the defendant did not use more force than actually or appar-
ently was necessary under the circumstances to protect himself from
imminent death or great bodily harm.25
This four-part test requires North Carolina courts to evaluate the conduct of a
defendant asserting self-defense on both subjective and objective levels.26 The
23. Id. at 391-94, 366 S.E.2d at 590-92.
24. Norman, 324 N.C. at 266, 378 S.E.2d at 16. On July 7, 1989, three months after the North
Carolina Supreme Court's decision reinstated Mrs. Norman's conviction, North Carolina Governor
James G. Martin commuted her sentence and ordered her released from prison. Ruffin, Battered
Wife Released From Prison, News & Observer (Raleigh), July 8, 1989, at Al, col. 1. Mrs, Norman
had served two months in prison. Id.
25. State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 70-71, 357 S.E.2d 654, 659 (1987).
26. Courts generally use either an objective or subjective standard to evaluate the second ele-
ment, the reasonableness of a defendant's actions. Courts in states that employ an objective stan-
dard, including North Carolina, require that defendant's fear be both honest and reasonable. W.
LAFAVE & A. Sco'rr, supra note 2, at 457. For examples of the application of this standard in cases
involving battered women, see Langley v. State, 373 So. 2d 1267, 1271 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979);
Nygren v. State, 616 P.2d 20, 22 (Alaska 1980); People v. Adis, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1196, 264
Cal. Rptr. 167, 179 (1989); People v. Reed, 695 P.2d 806, 807 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); People v.
Dillon, 24 Ill. 2d 122, 125, 180 N.E.2d 503, 504 (1962); State v. Nunn, 356 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1984); State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. 639, 649, 763 P.2d 572, 579 (1989) (overruling prior case
to extent that it called for subjective evaluation); State v. Lynch, 436 So. 2d 567, 569 (La. 1983); May
v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 784 (Miss. 1984); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 197, 478 A.2d 364, 373 (1984); State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247,
249, 719 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Ct. App. 1986); People v. Emick, 103 A.D.2d 643, 658, 481 N.Y.S.2d 552,
562 (1984); Easterling v. State, 267 P.2d 185, 187 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954); Commonwealth v. Helm,
402 A.2d 500, 504 (Pa. 1979).
A minority of courts, following the Model Penal Code's subjective approach, require the jury to
evaluate all of the circumstances and decide whether "[the] defendant's perception of the danger and
immediacy of the harm and the amount of force used was reasonable." Mather, supra note 2, at 569.
For cases applying a subjective standard, see State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 249, 719 P.2d 1268,
1270 (Ct. App. 1986) ("hybrid" standard adopted, but individual perception of the defendant is
crucial factor); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 130, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (1985) (test of
reasonableness is "whether the defendant's subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of
the danger was reasonable"); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 817-18 (N.D. 1983) (finder of fact
must view circumstances surrounding defendant's use of force from perspective of defendant to de-
termine if sufficient to create an honest and reasonable belief in the mind of defendant that force was
necessary to protect himself from imminent harm); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 520 n.2, 423
N.E.2d 137, 139 n.2 (1981) (jury must put itself in position of defendant "with her characteristics...
feelings... knowledge, and under the same circumstances and conditions that surrounded her at the
time the act was done"); Fielder v. State, 683 S.W.2d 565, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (statute
provides for subjective standard of reasonableness with the defendant's state of mind being the con-
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first element, that the defendant believe in the need for his actions, requires a
subjective analysis.2 7 The second element, that the defendant's belief be reason-
able, requires that the jury make an objective determination by considering all
the facts and circumstances as they appeared to the defendant at the time of the
killing. 2s This injection of an objective evaluation precludes a defendant from
successfully asserting perfect self-defense based only on an honest but unreason-
able belief.
The evaluation of the reasonableness of a defendant's actions often hinges
upon the "imminence" of the threat to the defendant.29 The requirement that
the attack be imminent is a sensible one, which ensures that killing the attacker
is used only as a last resort.30 The definition of imminence a jurisdiction adopts
may limit or broaden the scope of events and circumstances the jury is permitted
to consider in evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant's actions.31
trolling factor) (citing Thx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31(a), 9.32(3) (Vernon 1974)), rev'd on other
grounds, 756 S.W.2d 309 ('rex. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 594-95, 682
P.2d 312, 314 (1984) (jury must consider self-defense "in light of all circumstances known to the
defendant" and from "defendant's point of view as conditions appeared to her at time of the
killing").
27. State v. Webster, 324 N.C. 385, 392, 378 S.E.2d 748, 753 (1989) (stressing the importance
of evidence tending to show defendant killed his victim with the subjective belief that it was neces-
sary to do so to prevent his own death or bodily harm); see also State v. Spaulding, 298 N.C. 149,
159, 257 S.E.2d 391, 397 (1979) (finding prejudicial error in exclusion of testimony that defendant
feared physical harm and knew victim was dangerous); State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 642-43, 194
S.E.2d 353, 359 (1973) (finding prejudicial error in exclusion of evidence that defendant believed he
was about to be killed); State v. Hughes, 82 N.C. App. 724, 728, 348 S.E.2d 147, 150 (1986) (instruc-
tion on self-defense required when defendant testified that he feared for his life).
28. Spaulding, 298 N.C. at 158, 257 S.E.2d at 396. Courts employing an objective standard
require the jury to evaluate the reasonableness of the defendant's actions in light of how a person of
ordinary prudence and intelligence would respond under the same circumstances. State v.
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 817 (N.D. 1983); see also W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 2, at 455-
56 (generally defining objective standard); Buda & Butler, The Battered Wife Syndrome: A Backdoor
Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAM. L. 359, 370-71 (1984) (arguing that application of obiective
standard deprives battered women of self-defense justification because it fails to consider their unique
psychological perspective). Under this view, the jury does not consider the physical and psychologi-
cal characteristics unique to the accused when evaluating the reasonableness of the accused's beliefs.
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 817.
29. See Gappins, 320 N.C. at 71-73, 357 S.E.2d at 659-60 (court found no evidence of real or
apparent necessity because nothing indicated that an attack on defendant was imminent); State v.
Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 49-50, 340 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1986) (instruction on self-defense not required be-
cause eight hours elapsed between initial threat and time defendant sought out victim and shot him;
delay indicated that there was no threat of imminent harm); State v. Wilson, 304 N.C. 689, 695-96,
285 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1982) (defendant not entitled to instruction on self-defense in light of his admis-
sion that he returned to the scene of initial altercation, struck the victim, and shot him in the back;
these factors suggested that threat was not imminent); State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 528, 279 S.E.2d
570, 572 (1981) (instruction on perfect self-defense warranted because victim struck and knocked
defendant to the ground, and defendant shot victim as he was advancing on her again).
30. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 2, at 458-59; see Norman, 324 N.C. at 261, 378 S.E.2d
at 13.
31. Although there is no all-encompassing definition of "imminent," the Norman court sug-
gested that the term is synonomous with "immediate," or "about to [happen]." Norman, 324 N.C.
at 261, 378 S.E.2d at 13. California courts have taken a similar view, defining "imminent peril" as
existing at the exact moment the fatal shot was fired: "immediate and present and not prospective or
even in the near future." People v. Axis, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1187, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172
(1989). Other jurisdictions have rejected the assertion that "immediate" and "imminent" are inter-
changeable terms. In State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (1985), the Supreme Court of
Kansas reversed defendant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter because the term "immediate"
rather than "imminent" appeared in the jury instructions, thereby placing "undue emphasis on the
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The third element of self-defense requires that the defendant be "without
fault in provoking, or engaging in, or continuing a difficulty with another."'32
Even when the defendant honestly believes it necessary to kill to avoid his ownimminent death, if the initial threat that prompted that fear has subsided or is
removed in time from the actual killing, the defendant's actions constitute a new
confrontation and render his belief in the need to kill unreasonable. 33 To require
the defendant to have "clean hands" follows logically from the classification of
perfect self-defense as a justification, because society will not sanction a killing
the need for which the defendant created.34
Finally, the fourth element seeks to ensure that the defendant does "not
resort to the use of deadly force to protect himself from mere bodily harm or
offensive physical contact."' 35 Only when threatened with a felonious assault is
the defendant justified in using deadly force. 36 This is not, however, an inflexible
rule.37 In North Carolina the rule is qualified in cases involving either multiple
assailants or a disparity in strength between the defendant and the victim.3 8
Although society at large recently has become attuned to the pervasive so-
cial problem of domestic violence,39 it has not yet attained a sophisticated un-
immediate action of the deceased, and obliterat[ing] the nature of the buildup of terror and fear
which had been systematically created over a long period of time." Id. at 468, 693 P.2d at 479; see
Mather, supra note 2, at 567-68 (discussing Hundley). In State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559
P.2d 548 (1977), the Washington Supreme Court held that an instruction limiting the jury's inquiry
to the time immediately prior to the shooting was erroneous because it restricted the jury's inquiry
into the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 234-36, 559 P.2d at 555-56. The Model Penal Code's
characterization of "imminent" is slightly broader, requiring that force must be exerted against an
unlawful attack "on the present occasion." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985).
32. State v. Anderson, 230 N.C. 54, 56, 51 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1949).
33. Mize, 316 N.C. at 53, 340 S.E.2d at 442 (1986). In Mize, the victim had been "out to get"
defendant earlier in the day. Eight hours later defendant went to the victim's trailer with a shotgun,
woke him, and shot him to death. The court found that defendant had become the aggressor and
affirmed the trial court's refusal to submit self-defense instructions to the jury. Id; see also Wilson,
304 N.C. at 695-96, 285 S.E.2d at 808 (1982) (defendant not entitled to assert self-defense after
evidence showed that he and his victim engaged in a fight after which victim threatened to kill him.
Defendant then went home, got a gun, returned to the scene of the fight, and shot the victim in the
back).
34. For a discussion of the distinction between justification and excuse, see supra note 2 and
infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
35. State v. Hunter, 315 NC. 371, 373, 338 S.E.2d 99, 102 (1986) (citing State v. Clay, 297 N.C.
555, 563, 256 S.E.2d 176, 182 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 290
S.E.2d 574 (1982)). North Carolina draws a distinction, based on the amount of force allowed,
between the rights of self-defense in response to felonious assaults and misdemeanor assaults. Id. at
373, 338 S.E.2d at 101. A felonious assault involves an intent to kill or to inflict serious harm,
coupled with use of a deadly weapon. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32 (1986).
36. Hunter, 315 N.C. at 373, 338 S.E.2d at 102.
37. Traditionally the deadly force requirement presupposed two equally capable men fighting
each other. Mather, supra note 2, at 565. Against a woman, however, the attacks of an unarmed
man may be deadly force. Id. Therefore, the modem trend is to consider the "respective size of the
parties, their sex, the particularly violent nature of the attack, and the attacker's reputation for
violence or violent history." Id.
38. State v. Pearson, 288 N.C. 34, 40, 215 S.E.2d 598, 603 (1975).
39. See Mather, supra note 2, at 54546. Statistics indicate that each year two million to forty
million women endure beatings at the hands of their spouses or boyfriends. Kinports, Defending
Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 393 (1988) (citing A. JONES, WOMEN
WHO KILL 283 (1980) (between one-fourth and one-half of women living with men will be victims of
violence); Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Dofense, 15
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623, 624-25 (1980) (estimates one-third to one-half of all women will be
derstanding of the psychology of the battered woman, the batterer, or the
dynamics of the abusive relationship.40 Many people have difficulty understand-
ing why an adult woman does not leave the abusive relationship, involve the
police, or solicit help from friends or family.4 1 A battered woman's failure to
avail herself of these apparent solutions also is beyond the understanding of the
average juror.4 2 The resolution of these issues is just as complex as the presence
of wife-beating in society is ingrained.43 Therefore, expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome often is crucial to a successful assertion of self-defense.
44
Commentators have identified several factors that influence a battered wo-
victims); Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem,
Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267, 273 (1985) (each year between one-fifth and one-tenth
of women involved intimately with men will be abused)). Researchers estimate that at least one
battering incident will occur in one-half of all marriages. L. WALKER, supra note 3, at ix.
40. Mather, supra note 2, at 546.
41. Id. at 547.
42. For a discussion of the admissibility of expert testimony to assist juries in understanding
battered woman syndrome, see infra note 44 and accompanying text-
43. As society shifted from a matriarchal to a patriarchal orientation, attitudes toward women
changed; by the Middle Ages wife beating had become an accepted practice. Mather, supra note 2,
at 547 (citing Davidson, Wifebeating: A Recurring Phenomenon Throughout History, in BATrERED
WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMEsTIc VIOLENCE 12-14 (M. Roy ed. 1977)). Later,
England and the United States condoned physical violence if it satisfied the "Rule of Thumb." Id. at
547-48; see, eg., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 453 (1868) (court declined to punish husband
for beating wife because instrument employed was smaller in width than his thumb and because
court wished to avoid interfering in marital relationship).
44. Mather, supra note 2, at 546-47. Although courts are not unanimous in allowing expert
testimony concerning battered woman syndrome, they have increasingly permitted it. Id. at 574-75;
see Note, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J. FAm. L. 373 (1986).
A majority of courts addressing the issue has recognized that expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome can explain its psychological basis. State v. Steele, 359 S.E.2d 558, 564 (W. Va.
1987); see Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761, 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So.
2d 801, 806-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Strong v. State, 251 Ga. 540, 541, 307 S.E.2d 912, 913
(1983); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981); People v. Minnis, 118 Ill. App.
3d 345, 357-58, 455 N.E.2d 209, 217 (1983); State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. 639, 646, 763 P.2d 572, 576
(1988); State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 71, 716 P.2d 563, 570 (1986); Commonwealth v. Rose, 725
S.W.2d 588, 591 (Ky. 1987); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981); State v. Baker, 120 N.H.
773, 775-76, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 202, 478 A.2d 364, 381 (1984);
State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 253, 719 P.2d 1268, 1274 (1986); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d
129, 134-35, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362-63 (1985); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819 (N.D. 1983);
State v. Thomas, 13 Ohio App. 3d 211, 214, 468 N.E.2d 763, 765 (1983); State v. Hill, 287 S.C. 398,
399, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1986); State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 195-96, 685 P.2d 564, 570 (1984);
State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 597, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (1984); State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d
485, 494-95, 329 N.W.2d 161, 165-67 (1983). Two recent cases allowing such expert testimony are
State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (Minn. 1989), and People v. Axis, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178,
1198-1200, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 179-81 (1989). The Hennum court, however, limited use of the
testimony to a general description of the syndrome and its characteristics, and expressly prohibited
testimony that the defendant, in fact, suffered from the syndrome. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d at 799.
Such a determination, held the court, is exclusively within the province of the jury. Id. In Aris, the
court held that expert opinion is relevant only to prove an honest belief, not to prove reasonableness
of the belief. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 2d at 1199, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179-80.
Cases dissallowing expert testimony include Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893, 894
(D.C. 1983); Mullis v. State, 248 Ga. 338, 338-39, 282 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1981); People v. White, 90
Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1071-73, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200-01 (1980); Fultz v. State, 439 N.E.2d 659, 662 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1982); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Fielder v. State, 683
S.W.2d 565, 592 (Tex. App. Ct. 1985), rev'd, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Buhrle v.
State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1377-78 (Wyo. 1981). For a discussion of the criticisms of admitting expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome, see infra note 53.
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man's decision to remain in an abusive relationship.4 5 The woman may believe
she is not able to escape. 46 Often the woman has tried to leave, only to have her
husband find her and force her to return. 47 She may fear that if she leaves, her
husband will kill her, their children, or anyone who helps her escape.48 The
abusive husband often isolates his wife, keeping her from making friends or even
leaving the house; therefore, the woman has no one to support her if she does
decide to leave. 49 In many cases, the battered woman's prior attempts to escape
have been met with police who are reluctant to intervene,50 prosecutors who
discourage the pursuit of formal charges, and judges who impose lenient
sentences. 5 1 Finally, despite the violence, the woman loves her husband, is loyal
to him, and believes he needs her.52
Perhaps the best known and most frequently cited explanation of abusive
relationships is Dr. Lenore Walker's cycle theory of violence. 53 According to
Dr. Walker's theory, the abuse cycle consists of three phases: tension building,
45. These factors include financial dependence, see S. SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIO-
LENCE 1-2, 53-58 (1982); fear of losing custody of children, see A. BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED
WOMEN KILL 55-74 (1987); fear of child abuse, see id. at 94; humiliation, see Moore, Editor's Intro-
duction to L. WALKER, supra note 3, at 7, 13-14 (D. Moore ed. 1979); and genuine hope that the
abuse will end, see Geller, Conjoint Therapy: Staff Training and Treatment of the Abuser and the
Abused, in THE ABUSIVE PARTNER: AN ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC BATTERING 198-99 (M. Roy ed.
1982).
46. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
47. See, eg., A. JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 298-99 (1980).
48. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 42 (1984) ("Women commonly re-
ported phrases such as 'IfI can't have you, no one will'; 'If you leave, I'll find you wherever you go';
'Just do that and you'll see how mean I can really be.' Threats of bodily mutilation such as cutting
up her face, sewing up her vagina, breaking her kneecaps, and knocking her unconscious also served
to terrify women.") For examples of such cases, see State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 251, 71') P.2d
1268, 1272 (Ct. App. 1986) (defendant's husband threatened to shoot her if she left); Ibn-Tamas v.
United States, 407 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. 1979) (defendant's husband threatened to fracture her skull
if she tried to leave or divorce him).
49. Kinports, supra note 39, at 402.
50. Howard, Husband- Wife Homicide" An Essay from a Family Law Perspective, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 63, at 69-70 (1986) (stating that in majority of spousal homicide cases the police
had been called previously to the home).
51. Kinports, supra note 38, at 403-04; see, e.g., People v. Powell, 102 Misc. 2d 775, 777, 424
N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (1980) (defendant's husband repeatedly ignored court-issued protective orders),
affid, 83 App. Div. 2d 719, 442 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1981); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 593, 682
P.2d 312, 313 (1984) (defendant's husband entered defendant's home in violation of restraining
orders).
52. Mather, supra note 2, at 553 (citing A. BROWNE, supra note 45, at 141-42 (1987)).
53. Id.; see L.WALKER, supra note 3, at 55-70. Many courts have adopted Walker's theories.
See supra note 44 and cases cited therein. Walker's explanation of battered woman syndrome and
the cycle theory of violence, however, is not universally accepted. See Kinports, supra note 39, at
407. Courts and commentators that have questioned the validity of Walker's research point to lack
of a control group, insufficient sample size, and interviewer bias. See, e.g., Note, The Battered Wo-
man Syndrome and Self-Defense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 636-43 (1986)
(arguing against admission of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome); Note, Does Plight
Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defenm, 62
IND. L.J. 1253, 1263-67 (1987) (arguing against admissibility because battered woman syndrome is
not beyond the ken of the average juror and because Walker's theories are of questionable validity);
see also supra note 44 (citing cases disallowing expert testimony on battered woman syndrome).
Rather than render defendants' expert testimony inadmissible, one commentator suggested that the
methodological criticisms of Walker's theory be disclosed at trial to assist thejury in determining the
weight to be given expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. Kinports, supra note 39, at 407.
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acute battering, and contrition.54 During the tension building phase, usually the
longest of the cycle, minor battering incidents occur and escalate in severity over
time.5 5 The most severe beatings occur during the second phase, which is distin-
guished by the batterer's loss of control and the unpredictable timing of beat-
ings.5 6 Finally, during the third phase the batterer typically expresses
tremendous remorse, promises to stop the violence, and acts in a loving and kind
way.
57
Two additional psychological theories, intermittent reinforcement and
learned helplessness, offer some explaination of the dynamics present in bat-
tering relationships. 58 The intermittent reinforcement theory posits that when
reinforcement of certain behavior occurs at irregular and unpredictable inter-
vals, that behavior becomes extremely difficult to modify or extinguish 9 Ap-
plying this concept to the abusive relationship, intermittent periods of contrition
serve as positive reinforcement for the woman, encouraging her to remain in the
relationship and making it very difficult for her to extricate herself from the
situationA0 The second theory, learned helplessness, describes a phenomenon
first observed in animals: those animals that are subjected continuously to situa-
tions over which they have no control ultimately lose the ability to respond even
after experimenters have restored their control. 61 Similarly, a battered woman
may lose her ability to escape from the violence because she perceives herself to
be powerless to control her situation.62 As a result, when opportunities to es-
cape arise, she may not recognize them or may not be able to take advantage of
them.63
Against this psychological and social backdrop the North Carolina Court
of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the tension be-
tween the traditional rules of self-defense and the special case of the battered
woman. The two courts reached dramatically different results.
In the North Carolina Court of Appeals, Mrs. Norman argued that the trial
54. See L. WALKER, supra note 3, at 55; Hilberman, Overview: The "Wife Beater's Wife" Re-
considered, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1336, 1339 (1980).
55. L. WALKER, supra note 3, at 56-59. This phase may last as long as 10 years. Id. at 58.
56. Id. at 59-61. This is the shortest phase, ranging anywhere from two to twenty-four hours.
Id. at 60.
57. Id. at 65-66. In some cases, however, the third phase either is not present or disappears
over time. See Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome Study, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES:
CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 31, 44 (D. Finkelhor & R. Gelles eds. 1983).
58. Mather, supra note 2, at 553-54.
59. Id. at 554 (citing Geller, supra note 45, at 198-99).
60. Id.
61. Id. Lenore Walker's concept of "learned helplessness" is based on experiments conducted
by Martin Seligman. See L. WALKER, supra note 48, at 86. During the experiments dogs received
electrical shocks at random intervals. The dogs soon learned that they could exert no control over
the pain and ceased trying to escape. Even when the dogs regained the ability to escape from the
pain, researchers had to retrain the dogs to avoid the shocks voluntarily by repeatedly dragging
them from their cages until they learned to escape on their own. See M. SELIGMAN, HELPLESSNESS:
ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT & DEATH 23-25 (1975).
62. Mather, supra note 2, at 554.
63. Id. (citing A. BROWNE, supra note 45, at 122-27).
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judge erred by failing to submit an instruction on self-defense to the jury.64 The
court of appeals held that "with the battered spouse there can be... an unlawful
killing of a passive victim that does not preclude the defense of perfect self-
defense" 65 and ordered a new trial.66 The court further directed that the jury
consider evidence of battered woman syndrome only as some evidence67 and
evaluate it in conjunction with all other evidence to determine the existence of a
reasonable doubt as to the unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct. 68 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court claimed to have applied a hybrid standard of rea-
sonableness to the defendant's actions, employing both subjective and objective
measures.69 Closer inspection, however, reveals that the court based its decision
64. State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384, 385, 366 S.E.2d 586, 587 (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 253,
378 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
65. Id. at 393, 366 S.E.2d at 592. For a discussion of the distinction between perfect and imper-
fect self-defense, see supra note 2. The court of appeals found no error in the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense. Id. at 391, 366 S.E.2d at 590. However, by stating that
imperfect self-defense requires that the act be committed without murderous intent, the court ap-
pears to have misinterpreted the definition of imperfect self-defense established by prior case law.
North Carolina law defines imperfect self-defense as follows:
[]f defendant believed it was necessary to kill the deceased in order to save herself
from death or great bodily harm, and if defendant's belief was reasonable in that the cir-
cumstances as they appeared to her at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the
mind of a person of ordinary firmness, but defendant, although without murderous intent,
was the aggressor in bringing on the difficulty, or defendant used excessive force, the de-
fendant under those circumstances has only the imperfect right of self-defense, having lost
the benefit of perfect self-defense, and is guilty at least of voluntary manslaughter.
State v. Wilson, 304 N.C. 689, 695, 285 S.E.2d 804, 808 (1982) (quoting State v. Norris, 303 N.C.
526, 530, 279 S.E.2d 570, 573 (1981)). The court of appeals' statement that if Mrs. Norman did not
intend to kill her husband, then the first requirement of self-defense, that she believe it necessary to
kill him, would not be satisfied, erroneously interprets the phrase "although without murderous
intent" to modify all of the elements of imperfect self-defense. State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384,
391, 366 S.E.2d 586, 590 (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989). Correctly viewed, that
phrase is applicable only to a situation in which the defendant is the initial aggressor. See State v.
Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 53, 340 S.E.2d 439, 441-42 (1986). In that case, if the defendant initiated the
confrontation with murderous intent, then regardless of the existence of the first two elements, im-
perfect self-defense is unavailable. Id. Assuming the presence of the first two elements, only if the
evidence established that Mrs. Norman was the initial aggressor and with murderous intent had
sought out her husband, would the presence of the murderous intent preclude imperfect self-defense.
Accordingly, the premise upon which the court of appeals based its rejection of imperfect self-de-
fense is flawed.
The North Carolina Supreme Court based its rejection of imperfect self-defense on the absence
of evidence supporting a reasonable belief in imminent threat, but may have recognized the court of
appeals' erroneous interpretation of "murderous intent." The supreme court stated, however, that
even assuming that Mrs. Norris was entitled to an instruction on imperfect self-defense, the error
was harmless. The supreme court thus limited its discussion to perfect self-defense. Norman, 324
N.C. at 260, 378 S.E.2d at 12-13.
66. State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384, 394, 366 S.E.2d 586, 592 (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 253,
378 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
67. Id. This directive by the court of appeals appears to ensure that existence of battered wo-
man syndrome would not in and of itselfjustify the killing of the abusive spouse. This view accords
with other jurisdictions. See, eg., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820 n.8 (N.D. 1983) ("the
law of self-defense will not... accommodate a theory that the existence of battered woman syn-
drome ... operates in and of itself to justify or excuse a homicide."); State v. Kelly, 33 Wash. App.
541, 544, 655 P.2d 1202, 1203 (1982) ("The existence of the syndrome... does not of itself establish
the legal right of the wife to kill the husband."). For a general discussion of this point, see Mather,
supra note 2, at 571-73.
68. State v. Norman, 89 N.C. App. 384, 394, 366 S.E.2d 586, 592 (1988), rev'd, 324 N.C. 253,
378 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
69. Id. at 391, 366 S.E.2d at 590. The court of appeals stated that "an examination of the
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on evidence purely subjective in nature.
The first element of self-defense, that the defendant believe in the need to
use force, calls for a subjective determination. 70 The court of appeals found that
Mrs. Norman's testimony regarding her belief that her husband would kill her,
the evidence of past physical abuse, and expert testimony would permit a jury to
find that Mrs. Norman had an honest belief in an imminent threat that necessi-
tated her actions.7 1
The critical flaw in the court of appeals' analysis lies in its evaluation of the
second element of self-defense, that the defendant's belief be reasonable. While
stating that this element requires an objective measure, the court based its find-
ing that sufficient evidence of reasonableness existed on defendant's fear of more
severe beatings, inability to withdraw from the volatile situation, and resulting
vulnerability to her husband.72 These factors are unique to the defendant as a
battered woman and cannot be generalized to the reasonable person. There is no
practical difference between the character of this evidence and that accepted by
the court in satisfaction of the subjective element of self-defense. The court, in
effect, employed a "reasonable battered woman" standard.73
Again relying on evidence of battered woman syndrome, the court stated
that the jury reasonably could have found that "decedent's sleep was but a mo-
mentary hiatus in a continuous reign of terror by the decedent, [and] that de-
fendant merely took advantage of her first opportunity to protect herself..."
thereby satisfying the third element of self-defense, that the defendant not be the
aggressor. 74 The court concluded that it is not necessary for "a battered person
[to] wait until a deadly attack occurs," or for the victim actually to be "attacking
or threatening to attack at the very moment defendant commits" the killing for
the self-defense justification to apply.75 In fact, the defendant is least able to
protect herself during the violent phase, which is when the traditional rules of
self-defense would require that she act.76 It is this interpretation of the "immi-
nence" requirement that figures prominently in the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision to reverse the court of appeals' decision and to reinstate Mrs.
elements of perfect self-defense reveals that both subjective and objective standards are to be applied
in making the crucial determinations." Id. For a discussion of the elements of self-defense, see supra
notes 2, 25-38 and accompanying texts.
70. Norman, 89 N.C. App. at 391-92, 366 S.E.2d at 590.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 392-93, 366 S.E.2d at 591.
73. See generally Kinports, supra note 39, at 412-17 (arguing that jury should be instructed to
acquit defendant if a reasonable battered woman, as opposed to a reasonable person, would have
feared her husband under the same circumstances). For a discussion of use of "reasonable battered
woman" standard as alternative to "reasonable person" to remedy the plight of battered women, see
infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
74. Norman, 89 N.C. App. at 394, 366 S.E.2d at 592. The court only cursorily treated the
fourth element, that defendant not use excessive force, simply finding that the expert testimony and
other evidence would permit the inference that the force used by Mrs. Norman was not excessive.
Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court treated this element very differently. See infra notes 78-86
and acompanying text.
75. Norman, 89 N.C. App. at 393, 366 S.E.2d at 592.
76. Id. (citing State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 220 n.23, 478 A.2d 364, 385 n.23 (1984)).
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Norman's conviction. 77
The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals' interpre-
tation of "imminence" as expansive,78 and instead took the position that "imme-
diate" and "imminent" are synonomous.79 This narrow interpretation of
imminence provides the basis for the court's conclusion that Mrs. Norman
lacked any belief-reasonable or otherwise-that an imminent threat of death or
great bodily harm confronted her, and thereby failed to satisfy either of the first
two elements of perfect self-defense. 80 First the court stated that Mrs. Norman
did not face an "instantaneous choice between killing her husband or being
killed or seriously injured."' 81 Instead the evidence supported the contention
that Mrs. Norman had adequate opportunity to avail herself of other means to
prevent further abuse by her husband. 82 Further, there was "no action under-
way by the decedent" either at the time of or "immediately prior to his falling
asleep."' 83 As such, the court found the record devoid 'of evidence that Mrs.
Norman had reasonable grounds to believe in an imminent attack. 84 Next, the
court concluded that testimony of the defendant and her two expert witnesses,
though illustrative of her fear of future beatings and belief that death was "inevi-
table," failed to demonstrate any belief of an "imminent" threat. 85 Therefore,
there was no evidence from which a jury could find that Mrs. Norman honestly
lelieved in the threat of imminent death or great bodily harm.8 6 This is a case of
semantics clouding substance; the evidence, considered in aggregate, clearly sup-
ports an inference that Mrs. Norman believed in an imminent threat. A finding
of a belief in an imminent threat, however, would not have changed the result,
because the belief would still, to the court, have been unreasonable.
Not only did the court find no evidence to support a finding of a belief in an
imminent threat, but it also concluded that even if defendant had demonstrated
77. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
78. Norman, 324 N.C. at 264, 378 S.E.2d at 15.
79. Id. at 261, 378 S.E.2d at 13. For a discussion of the various interpretations of "imminent,"
see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
80. Norman, 324 N.C. at 261-62, 378 S.E.2d at 13-14.
81. Id. at 261, 378 S.E.2d at 14.
82. Id. at 261-62, 378 S.E.2d at 13. In reaching this conclusion the majority pointed to undis-
puted evidence that Mrs. Norman left her sleeping husband, "walked to her mother's house, re-
turned with the pistol, fixed the pistol after it jammed and then shot her husband three times in the
back of the head." Id. at 261, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
83. Id. at 262, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 263, 378 S.E.2d at 14. The psychiatrist and psychologist both opined that killing her
husband "appeared reasonably necessary" to Mrs. Norman at the time of the killing. Id, This
testimony, however, did not establish Mrs. Norman's fear of imminent death or great bodily harm.
Id. Dr. Tyson testified that Mrs. Norman "believed herself to be doomed... to a life of the worst
kind of torture and abuse, degradation that she had experienced over the years in a progressive way;
that it would only get worse, and that death was inevitable." Id. Although Dr. Tyson's testimony
showed Mrs. Norman's general fear, it established only her speculative belief concerning the future.
Id.
Mrs. Norman's testimony was similarly inadequate. She testified that she believed the beating
would be "worse than [it] had ever been" and that "[Mr. Norman] would kill [her] if he got a
chance." Id. The court found this testimony insufficient to establish a belief in and fear of imminent
death or great bodily harm at the time of the killing. Id.
86. 1d. at 261, 378 $.E.2d at 13.
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a belief, by returning home and shooting her sleeping husband, Mrs. Norman
initiated a new confrontation, thereby rendering any such belief unreasonable.8 7
Finally, the court recognized the tremendous abuse Mrs. Norman endured, but
pointed to the lack of evidence that the abuse ever before had reached the degree
necessary to justify the use of deadly force; therefore, the use of deadly force was
excessive.8 8
According to the majority, the expanded definition of "imminent" proposed
by the court of appeals would work a substantial change on the law of self-
defense, encourage self-help, and "categorically legalize the opportune killing of
abusive husbands by their wives solely on the basis of the wives' testimony con-
cerning their subjective speculation as to the probability of future felonious as-
saults by their husbands."8 9 Such a result would undermine the purpose of the
imminence requirement, which is to ensure that deadly force is used only as a
"last resort in the exercise of the inherent right of self-preservation." 90 More-
over, the court argued that such relaxed self-defense requirements could, in the-
ory, result in the use of the self-defense justification in any situation in which a
defendant testified as to his subjective belief that a killing was necessary in re-
sponse to a threat. 91
Justice Martin penned a vigorous dissent.92 He first took issue with the
majority's concern over the important role the testimony of the battered woman
would assume by reminding the majority that cases involving battered women
are not the only situations that pose threats of invented evidence. 93 Justice Mar-
tin criticized the majority's fear of allowing an expansion of" 'our law of self-
defense beyond the limits of immediacy and necessity'" for mischaracterizing
the result sought by defendant. 94 Acceptance of defendant's argument, he con-
tended, would not result in an expansion or alteration of existing law, but in the
correct application of the traditional rules of self-defense.95 The dissent stated
that evaluation of the "imminence" requirement must answer the question "not
whether the threat was in fact imminent, but whether the defendant's belief in
the impending nature of the threat, given the circumstances as she saw them,
87. Id. at 262, 378 S.E.2d at 13-14.
88. Id. at 265, 378 S.E.2d at 15. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the requirement that defendant not use excessive force.
89. Norman, 324 N.C. at 265, 378 S.E.2d at 15.
90. Id. at 261, 378 S.E.2d at 13.
91. Id. at 266-67, 378 S.E.2d at 16.
92. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting). According to Justice Martin, any case involving an assertion of
self-defense poses the risk of false evidence. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting). Similarly, the state's task of
rebutting a defendant's evidence is difficult in all self-defense cases in which the only other witness is
deceased. Id. (Martin, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Martin pointed to the luxury in this case,
not found often in self-defense cases, of having several other witnesses corroborate defendant's
testimony concerning the history of severe physical abuse and those events that occurred over the
three days prior to the killing. These witnesses included defendant's mother, daughter, and daugh-
ter's boyfriend, as well as deputies and a friend of the decedent. Id. at 271-73, 378 S.E.2d at 19-20
(Martin, J., dissenting). He further noted that determining the credibility of and weight of evidence
is solely within the province of the jury. Id. at 267, 378 S.E.2d at 17 (Martin, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 267, 378 S.E.2d at 16 (Martin, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 267, 378 S.E.2d at 16-17. (Martin, J., dissenting).
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was reasonable in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness. ' ' 96 Based on testi-
mony tending to establish the presence of battered woman syndrome, Justice
Martin found that the battered spouse's fear that "'one day her husband
[would] kill her in the course of a beating' ,,97 created an honest belief that "dan-
ger [was] constantly 'immediate.' "98 According to Justice Martin, this state of
mind, unique to battered woman syndrome, serves not only to distinguish the
reasonableness of Judy Norman's perception of imminence from that of the de-
fendants in the case relied on by the majority, but also to satisfy the first two
elements of the self-defense justification.9 9
The dissent's reliance on the Model Penal Code highlights the weak link in
Justice Martin's argument. While contending that his interpretation of immi-
nence would not deviate from the objective interpretation traditionally employed
in North Carolina, Justice Martin bases his suggested interpretation upon a stan-
dard considered subjective in nature by commentators. 100 By requiring the jury
to assume the unique perceptions of the defendant, Justice Martin would in ef-
fect transform the "person of ordinary firmness" into the "reasonable battered
woman." 10 1 Contrary to Justice Martin's assertions, such a standard clearly
would effect a change in the traditional application of the rules of self-defense. 102
Accepting the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision as consistent with
96. Id. at 271, 378 S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting). Justice Martin found support for this
interpretation of "imminence" in a comment to the Model Penal Code: "'[t]he actor must believe
that his defensive action is immediately necessary and the unlawful force against which he defends
must be force that he apprehends will be used on the present occasion, but he need not apprehend
that it will be immediately used.'" Id. at 271 n.1, 378 S.E.2d at 19 n.1 (Martin, J., dissenting)
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 comment (ALI 1985)).
97. Id. at 270-71, 378 S.E.2d at 18-19 (Martin, J., dissenting) (quoting Note, The Battered
Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32 HASTNGS L.J. 895, 928-29 (1981)).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 270, 378 S.E.2d at 18 (Martin, J., dissenting). Justice Martin's reliance on evidence of
battered woman syndrome to determine both the subjective belief of defendant and objective reason-
ableness of her actions raises an interesting question: to which elements of self-defense is expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome relevant? While the majority opinion did not address the
admissibility of battered woman syndrome, Rule 704 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence,
which allows opinion testimony addressing an ultimate issue, would appear to permit testimony as to
both the defendant's perception of imminence and the reasonableness of that perception. N.C.R.
EVID. 704. Other courts employing an objective standard of reasonableness have adopted this view.
See, eg., State v. Stewart, 243 Kan. 639, 763 P.2d 572 (1988) (defendant acquitted of first degree
murder on testimony that defendant suffered from battered woman syndrome and had a "'really
grave lethal situation' "). But see People v. Axis, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1197-98, 264 Cal. Rptr.
167, 179-80 (1989) (holding that expert testimony as to defendant's state of mind is not relevant to
the reasonableness of defendant's actions; expert's explanation of battered woman syndrome as a
basis for defendant's perceptions is admissible as long as it does not express opinions on the "ulti-
mate issue that defendant did or did not have" required mental state for the crime). For a general
discussion of the admissibility of evidence of battered woman syndrome, see supra note 43.
100. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE AND A. ScoTr, supra note 2, at 458 n.29, 459 n.36.
101. See Kinports, supra note 39, at 415. See infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text for a
discussion of a "reasonable battered woman" standard as an alternative to the current standard.
102. Justice Martin also found evidence sufficient to support a finding that Mrs. Norman was not
the aggressor and did not use excessive force. Norman, 324 N.C. at 274-75, 378 S.E.2d at 21 (Mar-
tin, J., dissenting). Again relying on evidence of battered woman syndrome, lie stated that a jury
could view the incident that precipitated the killing as a "continuing assault," which from Mrs.
Norman's perspective did not end when her husband fell asleep. Id. The absence of any such "con-
tinuing assault" served to distinguish this case from the case relied on by the majority. Id. at 274,
378 S.E.2d at 21 (Martin, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Martin argued that testimony of Mrs.
Norman's friends and family that demonstrated her inability to strike back against her husband
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prior case law on self-defense does not necessitate a conclusion that such a result
is inevitable or desirable. The decision, however, does illustrate the need to ex-
amine the feasibility of changes in the existing law of self-defense or alternative
defenses that some commentators suggest would render a more equitable result
to women in situations such as that which confronted Mrs. Norman.
Allowing the jury to measure the defendant's conduct against that of the
"reasonable battered woman" is one alternative to the current reasonable person
standard. Characterizing the subjective and objective standards of reasonable-
ness as inflexible polar opposites denies the degree to which they sometimes
merge and places undue emphasis on formal rhetoric as opposed to the particu-
lar circumstances underlying each case. 10 3 Instead, commentators suggest that
these standards be viewed as representing different points on a continuum with
the crucial issue being not whether, but to what extent a jury may consider the
individual characteristics or circumstances of the defendant. 104 Including all of
the defendant's characteristics and experiences would, in effect require only an
honest belief in imminent danger.'0 5 Therefore, the question is which character-
istics should be considered when determining reasonableness. 106
In light of the fact that even those courts employing the least expansive
concept of the reasonable person still consider some of the defendant's charac-
teristics,10 7 a strong argument exists that the jury should evaluate the defend-
ant's actions under a "reasonable battered woman" standard.10 8 Only then can
a jury fully evaluate the reasonableness of the defendant's actions.'0 9 Propo-
nents argue that under this approach, the battered woman who kills in a non-
confrontational setting is entitled to assert self-defense.110
Criticisms of this approach abound. Some commentators consider this
standard oxymoronic: a woman suffering from battered woman syndrome can-
would allow a jury to infer that it reasonably appeared to her that killing Mr. Norman was the only
means available to protect herself. Id. at 275, 378 S.E.2d at 21 (Martin, J., dissenting).
103. Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self Defense" A Legal and Empirical Dissent,
supra note 53, at 643.
104. See id.; Kinports, supra note 39, at 411, 413. The jury is not compelled to create a hypo-
thetical person and then speculate as to how that person would have responded in the defendant's
shoes. Id. at 413. Unless the jury takes into account the defendant's characteristics and circum-
stances surrounding the killing, it cannot determine what a reasonable person would have done in
the same circumstances. Id.; see Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law,
33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 658-60 (1981) (arguing that "standard-like particularization" imposes vague-
ness on a determination of reasonableness).
105. Kinports, supra note 38, at 413.
106. Id. at 413.
107. Id. at 413-15. For example, juries may now consider evidence of disparity in size and
strength between the defendant and the attacker, and evidence of the defendant's physical handicap.
Id. Further, evidence of prior threats or acts of violence is admissible to support the reasonableness
of defendants' fear of imminent harm. Id. North Carolina cases are in accord with this view. See,
e-g., State v. Webster, 324 N.C. 385, 392-93, 378 S.E.2d 748, 753 (1989) (defendant allowed to testify
as to his heart condition, kidney failure and release from the hospital only two days before the
killing); State v. Spaulding, 298 N.C. 156, 158, 257 S.E.2d 396-97 (1979) (evidence of threats by
decedent and prior near fatal attack by another relevant to reasonableness of defendant's response to
decedent's behavior).
108. Kinports, supra note 39, at 415.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 465.
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not be reasonable. 11 ' Additionally, some argue that such a standard transforms
an objective standard into a purely subjective one.1 2 Another contention is that
use of a reasonable battered woman standard requires reclassification of self-
defense from a justification to an excuse.' 13 Justifying a battered woman's ac-
tions on the basis of psychological characteristics not present in the ordinary
person is contrary to the essence of justification theory, that anyone acting in a
similar manner would be entitled to an acquittal.114 Instead, the jury is in-
structed to acquit due to "an identifiable psychological syndrome that caused
[the battered woman] to assess the dangerousness of the situation in a different
manner than an average, ordinary person."' 15
Commentators have raised more serious questions regarding equal protec-
tion violations. 116 They argue that discrimination against male defendants and
victims will result from the use of a "reasonable battered woman" standard. 117
This argument is based on a United States Supreme Court ruling that in cases in
which gender-neutral devices are sufficient to address a problem, states are pro-
hibited from using gender classifications. 118 As such, a reasonable battered wo-
man standard would withstand a constitutional evaluation only upon a showing
that gender-neutral standards do not provide just results for battered women.' 1 9
Even if courts adopt a reasonable battered woman standard, conviction
may still result if the defendant cannot show a reasonable belief in an imminent
threat.120 North Carolina courts employ a very narrow definition requiring an
evaluation of the decedent's actions at the moment of the killing. 12 1 This inter-
pretation finds general support among those who believe that requiring an im-
111. Id. at 417; see C. EWING, BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DE-
FENSE As LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 56-57 (1987); Rosen, supra note 2, at 15-16 n.20.
112. Kinports, supra note 39, at 418; see Rittenmeyer, Of Battered Wives. Self-Defense and
Double Standards of Justice, 9 3. CRIM. JusT. 389, 392-93 (1981); Rosen, supra note 2, at 41-42
n.170. One commentator has argued that it would be impossible to confine such a standard to use in
battered women cases, but would lead to application of a reasonable intoxicated, hotheaded, or cow-
ardly defendant. See Kinports, supra note 39, at 418-19 (arguing that such extensions to include
these traits do not necessarily follow because' characteristics of the battered woman, unlike these
traits, are not within her control, do not evidence moral failure, and are not targeted by the law for
change).
113. Kinports, supra note 39, at 420; see Rosen, supra note 2, at 42-45. Professor Rosen argues
that stretching the traditional rules of self-defense to encompass cases in which battered women kill
their batterers in nonconfrontational situations raises the specter of encouraging self-help. Id. at 53.
Rosen further argues that by treating self-defense as an excuse, the judge is allowed to decide that it
would be unjust to convict the defendant, but is permitted to avoid a judgment that the defendant's
actions were right and just, which could result in increased violence against abusive husbands. Id. at
55. This, she concludes, would strike a proper balance between understanding the use of self-help,
but not encouraging it. Id. at 55. This appears to be a radical departure from the traditional classifi-
cation of self-defense as a justification and, given the tendency of the courts to ignore the theoretical
distinction between justification and excuse, is unlikely to take place.
114. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 42.
115. See, e-g., id. at 43.
116. Kinports, supra note 39, at 422.
117. See Buda & Butler, supra note 28, at 378-80; Rittenmeyer, supra note 112, at 393-95; Ro-
sen, supra note 2, at 33 n.126.
118. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (finding unconstitutional an Alabama statute authoriz-
ing the ordering of alimony payments by husbands but not wives).
119. Buda & Butler, supra note 28, at 379.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 24-31.
121. See supra notes 31, 78-84 and accompanying texts.
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mediate threat prevents unnecessary self-help. 1 22 According to this view, cases
involving battered women do not call for special treatment but illustrate just
how crucial the imminence requirement is in preventing self-help. 123 Others
argue that because the battered woman is faced with either waiting for her hus-
band to kill her or killing him first, the "imminency" requirement should be
construed loosely to allow her to claim self-defense. 124 In these cases, perhaps
the "proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat but the immediacy of the
response necessary in defense."'125 Under this view, if the threatened harm is of
a nature that by waiting until the last minute to take defensive action the in-
tended victim is effectively denied her right to self-defense, the law of self-de-
fense should allow her to act as early as necessary to defend herself. 126
However, determining at what point action becomes reasonably necessary would
depend on further subjective beliefs of the defendant and exacerbate the problem
of fabricated evidence that the narrow definition of imminence attempts to
counter. 
127
As a matter of public policy, the narrow interpretation of imminence re-
flects society's belief that every human life is valuable, even the lives of those
who evoke disgust and contempt, such as batterers and child molesters. 128
While there may not be a more sympathetic defendant than a battered woman or
molested child, the law does not sentence to death one who has threatened to
kill, even if he has fulfilled such threats in the past.129 Therefore, more than
severe beatings, psychological domination, and threats of death must be required
before self-defense becomes available. Moreover, although batterers undoubt-
edly deserve punishment, they are no less entitled to equal protection of their
lives. 130 The general deterrence offered by the narrowly construed imminence
requirement provides this protection. 131
Still remaining is the question of what change in the law, if any, would
strike a balance between the undeniably dire situation facing battered women
and society's interest in discouraging self-help in nonconfrontational settings.
122. See supra note 29; infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
123. W. LAFAVE & A. ScorT, supra note 2, at 458; see Note, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To
Kill or To Be Killed, 32 HASrINGs L.J. 895, 926-30 (1981).
124. See Note, supra note 123, at 928-30.
125. 2 P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(c)(1) (1984).
126. Id. Robinson provides the following example: A kidnapped D and told D that in one week
he would kill him. Every morning D had the chance to kill A and escape. If taken literally, the
imminence requirement would make D wait until A attempted to carry out his stated intention to
kill defendant before he could avail himself properly of self-defense. Id. However, such a case is
distinguishable from those involving battered women. First, the woman can physically leave (even
though she may honestly believe that she cannot). Second, to find her actions reasonable a jury
would have to consider her unique perceptions as a battered woman, while the reasonableness of D's
response is not dependent on an understanding of characteristics not present in all people.
127. See Norman, 324 N.C. at 265, 378 S.E.2d at 15.
128. See People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1189, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 174 (1989).
129. Id; see also Rosen, supra note 2, at 52 (pointing out that most people killed in self-defense
would not be sentenced to death if convicted of the threatened crimes).
130. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equal protection
challenges to the reasonable battered woman standard. Tailoring the imminence requirement of self-
defense to accommodate battered women would meet the same challenges.
131. Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1189, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
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Establishing the existence of battered woman syndrome as a new ground for an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter would accomplish this balance. 132 Cur-
rently the grounds for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter are imperfect
self-defense and adequate provocation. 133 A defendant asserting either of these
grounds must still withstand an objective reasonableness test. 134 Thus, the bat-
tered woman would face the same barriers as those she encounters when claim-
ing perfect self-defense. The legislature's establishment of the existence of
battered woman syndrome as a third ground for such an instruction avoids the
determination of reasonableness and other problematic issues, including the re-
quirements that defendant not be the initial aggressor or use excessive force.
The defendant is still punished for a killing that society cannot condone, but the
offense is mitigated and the penalty lessened. This result does not send a
message to the community that this behavior is encouraged or even acceptable,
but does provide for the defendant a more just outcome than a murder
conviction. 135
In conjunction with this change, the North Carolina General Assembly
should enact statutes designed to offer greater protection for battered women
and prevent domestic violence from escalating to the point at which self-help is
the battered woman's only apparent option.136 These statutes could include
provisions requiring law enforcement officers to make a warrantless arrest when
given cause to believe an incident of abuse has occurred within a certain period
of time,137 to advise the battered woman of the existence of shelters for her and
132. The definition of battered woman then would become all important. Dr. Walker's defini-
tion of a battered woman as one who has been through the three-phase cycle of violence at least
twice may be too broad. See Kinports, supra note 39, at 448. One commentator suggests that the
jury consider the number of battering incidents, the severity of the harm inflicted, and the frequency
of the beatings. Id. Courts should allow expert testimony on battered woman syndrome if the de-
fendant presents any evidence of abuse. Id. at 449. Whether the defendant is in fact a battered
woman ultimately is a question for the jury. Id.
133. For definition of voluntary manslaughter, see supra note 22.
134. A jury must determine the existence of adequate provocation to convict a defendant of
voluntary manslaughter. Kinports, supra note 39, at 462. In evaluating whether the provocation
was such as would arouse passion in the "reasonable person," a prolonged history of abuse and
threats of death may be insufficient. Id. This is the same difficulty present in self-defense cases. Id.
135. Classifying battered woman syndrome as an excuse would have the same effect.
136. The current statutes concerning domestic violence are codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B
(1989).
137. Such a provision may have prevented the tragedy in Norman. The officer testified that
when he responded to a call from Mrs. Norman the evening before the killing, he found her bruised
and crying. Norman, 324 N.C. at 272, 378 S.E.2d at 19 (Martin, J., dissenting). When Mrs. Nor-
man told the officer that "her husband had beaten her all day long" and she "could not take it any
longer," the officer responded that "he could do nothing for her unless she took out a warrant on her
husband." Id. (Martin, J., dissenting).
In Missouri, an officer can arrest a person without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe
that the person has assaulted a family or household member. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085 (Vernon
Supp. 1990). The asssault does not have to have occurred in the presence of the officer. Id. If the
officer chooses not to make an arrest, he must file a report explaining his reasons. Id. Any officer
called to the same address within 12 hours of the first report shall make an arrest on probable cause
to believe the same offender has committed another violation. Id. The victim's refusal to sign an
official complaint shall not prevent an arrest. Id.
Florida law allows a law enforcement officer to arrest a person without a warrant when there is
probable cause to believe "that the person has committed a battery upon the person's spouse," the
officer "reasonably believes that there is danger of violence unless the person alleged to have commit-
ted the battery" is arrested immediately, and he finds "evidence of bodily harm" or "evidence of
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any minor children and of the legal channels available to her,' 38 and to apply
the same standards for response to complaints of domestic violence as are ap-
plied to cases involving strangers.139 Further, the legislature should implement
a "cooling off period" during which the battering spouse is denied bail. 140 Addi-
tionally, the law should establish spouse abuse as a separate and distinct offense,
which in its most severe forms is punishable as a felony. 141 Finally, the legisla-
ture must allocate more financial resources to the operation of shelters for bat-
tered women and for programs designed to rehabilitate battering spouses.
There is no question that the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
State v. Norman is a correct application of the existing law. That this is true
illustrates how inadequately traditional rules of law are equipped to resolve the
problem of domestic violence, and exemplifies the need for changes in the law
that will recognize the impact of battered woman syndrome on its victims and
ensure more equitable treatment of cases involving battered women. Modifica-
tion of the law of self-defense is not an appropriate means to remedy the di-
lemma facing women who suffer from battered woman syndrome. Although
society sympathizes with her situation, it cannot accommodate her at the ex-
pense of principles of general deterrence and equal protection of human life.
Altering the definition of voluntary manslaughter to include defendants who act
while suffering from battered woman syndrome, while simultaneously enacting
comprehensive legislation in an effort to preempt the outbreak of violence, will
strike the proper balance between individualized justice for the battered woman
and general deterrence of uncontrolled self-help.
KERRY A. SHAD
corroboration based upon the statements of one or more eyewitnesses." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15
(West Supp. 1990).
138. Florida requires any law enforcement officer investigating a complaint of domestic violence
to provide the victim the telephone number of the domestic violence center, and a copy of the follow-
ing statement:
IF YOU ARE THE VICTIM OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, you may ask the state
attorney to file a criminal complaint You also have the right to go to court and file a
petition requesting an injunction for protection from domestic violence which may include,
but need not be limited to, provisions which restrain the abuser from further acts of abuse;
direct the abuser to leave your household, prevent the abuser from entering your residence,
school, business, or place of employment; award you custody of your minor child or chil-
dren; and direct the abuser to pay support to you and the minor children if the abuser has a
legal obligation to do so.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.29 (1986).
139. Missouri has enacted laws prohibiting law enforcement officers from assigning complaints
of domestic violence or violation of protective orders a lower priority than complaints involving
strangers. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.080(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990). Officers must respond immediately
if "l) [t]he caller indicates that violence is imminent or in progress; or 2) [a] protection order is in
effect; or 3) [t]he caller indicates that incidents of domestic violence have occurred previously be-
tween the parties." Id.
140. In Nevada one "arrested for a battery upon his spouse, former spouse, a person to whom he
is related by blood, a person with whom he is or was actually residing or with whom he has a child in
common, his minor child or a minor child of that person" must wait at least 12 hours after his arrest
before being admitted to bail. NEV. REv. STAT. § 178.484(3) (1985).
141. Arkansas has done this. Domestic abuse is categorized as either wife-battering or assault
on a wife. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-26-301 to -07 (1979). First and second degree wife battering
and aggravated assault on a wife are felonies, while third degree wife battering and all degrees of
assault on a wife are misdemeanors. See id.
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